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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

JUDY CAROL LEGGROAN,

12048

Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty
to the crime of murder in the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The jury found the defendant guilty of second
degree murder in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate term for the crime of murder in the
second degree.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The respondent submits that the judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent stipulates to the appellant's
facts except for t.he following observation.

It should be noted that there is conflicting evidence concerning the sequence of events immediately prior to the shooting. A police officer testified
that the appellant said to him on the evening of the
shooting that her husband called the appellant's
mother a whore which made the appellant very
angry. She reached under the bed and picked up a
gun." ... I had to put guts in it," she stated. The
appellant then stood up and shot him (T. 290-91).
Later at trial, the appellant testified that the argu·
men had erupted into a fight when her husband
threatened her with a gun and called her mother a
whore, and in the ·struggle she took the gun away
from him and shot him (T. 548-49).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIS-TINGUISHING VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER FROM
MURDER NOR IN ITS DEFINITION OF "IN THE
HEAT OF PASSION."

Manslaughter is explicitly distinguished from
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murder in Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure§
271at574 (Anderson ed. 1957):
"Manslaughter is unlawful homicide without malice aforethought, either express or implied. The element of malice aforethought must
be absent or the homicide will by definition be
murder. The absence of malice distinguishes
it from any degree of murder. Manslaughter is
a distinct offense, not a degree of murder, although both manslaughter and murder are kinds
or categories of homicide." See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-30-1, 76-30-5 (1953).

The element of malice is also defilned in the
Utah Code Ann. § 70-30-2 (1953):
"Such malice may be express or implied.
It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of
a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart."

In the instant case, the appellant was charged in the
information with the commission of murder in the
first degree, and the appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Consequently, the State carried the burden
of proving the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. In arriving at a verdict,
the Utah Code Ann. § 77-33-5 (1953) requires the jury
to find the degree of homicide:
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"Whenever a crime is distinguished into
degrees, the jury, if they convict the defendant,
must find the degree of the crime of which he
is guilty."

Under this Section, the degree of homicide should
be determined so the court must instruct the jury on
the lesser grades of the offense where the evidence
warrants such instruction. Stafr v. Ferguson, 74 Utah
263, 279 P. 55, 56 (1929) and State v. Campbell, 24 Utah
103, 66 P. 771 (1901). Sufficient evidence was present in this case to warrant such instructions, and
the court instructed the jury that the State had to
prove any offense-murder in first degree, murder
in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and
involuntary manslaughter - beyond a reasonable
doubt. The jury considered each offense in the order
given in the jury instructions and determined
whether they were convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that one of the offenses was committed (R. 24,
26, 28, 29). When the court instructed the jury concerning the elements of voluntary manslaughter, the
appellant alleges that the court erred in defining "in
the heat of passion' as such emotional or mental
state as to irresistably compel an ordinary reasonable person to commit the act charged.
11

11

In view of the definitions of murder and manslaughter, a charge of murder in the first or second
degree can be reduced to voluntary manslaughter
only if it can be shown that malice, either express
or implied, was not present in the alleged a:ct.
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Conceptually, the crime of manslaughter was
devised to treat leniently those who were transgressors by reason of provoked wrath rather than by a
deliberate intent and forethought. Burdick, The
Law of Crime §§ 458, 460 (1946). The reason for the
lenient treatment of such transgressors is that they
committed the alleged homicide by being provoked
to such a degree of passion that no malice or a premeditated intent to take a life was present, and the
homicide occurred because passion displaced any
deliberate or premeditated intent. Consequently,
the homicide is voluntary manslaughter not murder.
The respondent submits that the jury instruction
that the heat of passion must "irresistably compel an
ordinary reasonable person to commit the act
charged .... " ih not too strict a standard to express
what degree the heat of passion must be. If the
homicide occurs from any degree of malice or deliberate intent, it is then an element of murder and
not manslaughter. The standard for manslaughter
must be high enough to ascertain whether or not
the act charged was the result of passion which
completely displaced any element of malice.
Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 275
at 583 (supra):
"The passion aroused by the provocation
must be so violent as to dethrone the reason
of the accused for the time being; it must prevent thought and reflection, and the formation
of. a deliberate. purpose. The theory of the law
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is that malice cannot exist at the same time as
passion of this degree, and that the act of the
defendant therefore cannot be considered the
product of malice aforethought. Mere anger, in
and of itself, is not sufficient, but must be of
such a character as to prevent the individual
from cool reflection and a control of his
actions."

Case law holds that manslaughter requires a passion of an uncontrollable nature which suspends
momentarily the exercise of cool reason. By definition, the "heat of passion" is the degree of
passion which suspends cool reason, is uncontrollable, and "irresistably compels" an individual to cause the act committed. If the degree
of passion were any lower than the suspension of
cool reason, it would be the element of malice or
intent in murder and no longer an element of passion in voluntary manslaughter. Zenou v. State, 4
Wis.2d 655, 91 N.W.2d 208, 214 (1958); People v. Harris,
8 Ill. 2d 431, 134 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1956); State v. McAllister, 41 N.J. 342, 196 A.2d 786, 792 (1964); State v.
Smart, 328 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Mo. 1959); State v. Cobo,
90 Utah 89, 6 P.2d 952 (1936); People v. Calton, 5 Utah
451, 16 P. 902, rev'd on other grounds, 130 U.S.
83 (1888). Therefore, the standard for determining the
sufficient degree of passion should be so strict that
the jury has to be persuaded beyond a reasonable
doubt that no malice or premeditated intent was
present before a verdict of voluntary manslaughter
can be formed. The appellant submits that the trial
court did not set too strict a standard in its definition
of "in the heat of passion" which required an in-

7

dividual to be "irresistably compelled to commit the
act charged."
. POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
PROVE ANY ELEMENT OF DEFENSE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT AND ASSUMED ONLY THE
BURDEN OF THE RISK OF NON-PERSUASION.

The appellant disagrees with jury instruction
28 because the instruction allegedly requires that
two elements of voluntary manslaughter, "without
malice" and "in the heat of passion," be proven by
the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt in order
for the appellant to reduce the charge from second
degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. Such a
requirement, it is argued, would therefore shift the
burden of proof to the appellant and would only
confuse the jury as to what is reqquired to be
believed beyond a reasonable doubt to justify a
valid verdict. An analysis of this argument is best
understood when the purpose and meaning of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "burden of proof"
are clearly understood.
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" is a phrase which
measures the degree of the jury's persuasion in
criminal cases. This standard indicates the positiveness of persuasion that must exist in the form of a
verdict for conviction. 9 J. Wigmore, Burden of Proof
§ 2497 at 317 (3d ed. 1940). In the case of State v. McCune, 16 Utah 170, 51 P. 818 (1898), which involved an
appeal of a jury verdict of guilty of assault with an
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intent to commit rape on the basis of insufficient
evidence, the Utah Supreme Court specifically held
that this was the standard for the sufficiency of evidence for criminal cases.
"When the intent is the gist of the offense,
that intent should be shown by such evidence
as, uncontradicted, will authorize it to be presumed beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to
convict, it is incumbent upon the prosecution
to prove its case, and establish the defendant
guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a mere imaginary, captious, or
possible doubt, but a fair doubt, based upon
reason and common sense, and growing out of
the testimony in the case. It is such a doubt as
will leave the juror's mind, after a careful examination of all the evidence, in such a condition
that he cannot say that he has an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty of the defendant's
guilt." Id. at 819.

Other Utah cases which hold this standard
applicable for criminal convictions include State v.
Adamson, 101 Utah 534, 125 P.2d 429, 430 (1942); State v.
Hillstrom, 46 Utah 341, 150 P. 935, 942 (1915); State v.
Green, 77 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931); State v.
Gutbeil, 98 Utah 205, 98 P.2d 943, 944 (1940).
If this standard of persuasion is not obtainedguilt beyond a reasonable doubt,"-the defendant
is then entitled to an acquittal. This proposition is
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-4 (1953):
1'

"A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is

proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal.''
.

In cases where the degree of persuasion is less
than "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," the proseof proof" and
cution has failed to carry its
the defendant is acquitted of the criminal charge.
State v. Coyle, 41 Utah 320, 126 P. 305, 308 (1912); State v.
Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957). Consequently, the prosecution may prevail in a critninal
case if he can establish "guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt/' but the defendant may be acquitted if he
can raise a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds as
to the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's argument.
"Burden of proOf" has two definitions that can
be applied in a criminal trial. Abbot, Two Burdens of
Proof, 6 Harv. L. Rev. 125 (1892). One definition is
that the party who has invited the issue carries the burden of persuasion for his cause of action
to establish by evidence the requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact, i.e., in crimin_al
cases the prosecution must establish ''guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt." 9 J. Wigmore, Burden of
2487 at 278, supra. Obviously, this burden does not
shift because the prosecution's cause. of action
would be defeated if the prosecution shifted or
abandoned this burden of persuasion, anq the jury
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would then be left with a reasonable doubt as to
why the prosecution would leave this burden.
The second definition given to "burden of
proof" is that the burden of going forward with evidence may shift from one party to another during
the course of the trial. When the prosecution has
invited the issue and has produced sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer the fact alleged from the circumstance proved, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to introduce rebutting
evidence or evidence establishing some defense to
avoid the risk of a ruling against the defendant. 9
J. Wigmore, Burden of Proof§ 2485 at 270, supra. Unlike the first definition of burden of proof, this burden does shift depending on the quantity of evidence produced by the moving party, and is often
referred to as the risk of non-persuasion. It is this
burden that shifts in a murder case as described by
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-31-12 (1953):
"Upon a trial for murder, the commission
of the homicide by the defendant being proved,
the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation or that jilstify or excuse it, shall devolve
upon him, unless the proof on the part of the
prosecution tends to show that the crime committed amounts only to manslaughter, or that
the defendant was justified or excusable."

In view of these definitions, the appellee submits that there was no shifting of the burden of per·
-suasion-the burden of establishing guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but that there may have been a
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duty on the part of the appellant to bring forth evidence to mitigate or rebut the evidence that the
appellant had brought forth to avoid an adverse rulproduced mitigating circumstances which included
two elements of voluntary manslaughter, "heat
of passion" and "without malice." But as already
argued ,the appellant had to only raise a reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jurors concerning the
element d malice in order to obtain an acquittal
of the murder charge and did not have to
prove the elements of voluntary manslaughter
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to defeat the
prosecution's argument (Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-4
(1953). This was clearly understood by the jurors because the court in instruction 28 specifically stated:
"You are further instructed that the
burden is upon the State to prove t.o your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt that
all of the foregoing elements of the crime of
Voluntary Manslaughter are present in this
case; and if the State shall have failed to
satisfy your minds beyond a reasonable doubt
upon ·one or more of said elements, then you
must acquit the defendant of volunt.ary manslaughter, and you: should consider whether or
not she is guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter."

In view of the jury verdict in favor of the prosetion, it follows that the appellant's theory of mitigating circumstances failed to raise a reasonable doubt
_in the jury's mind concerning the prosecution's
theory of murder. Consequently, the appellant suf-
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fered an adverse ruling and must accept the degree
of persuasion of the trier of fact as to the verdict of
second degree murder. The jury instructions clearly
stated that the burden was upon the State to prove
the elements of voluntary manslaughter "beyond a
reasonable doubt," and the appellant needed only
to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury
to be entitled to an acquittal.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT DOES NOT
SHOW THAT THE MANNER OF JURY SELECTION
WAS INTENTIONAL, PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION.

The appellant's authority for the proposition that
a "substantial portion of the community" was excluded from the jury rests partly upon several civil
rights cases. These cases rely upon the constitutional principle of the Fourteenth Amendment that
a purposeful or deliberate exclusion of Negroes from
jury service is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
0880); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S.· 442, 447 (1900). Such discrimination
on account of race was present in the civil rights
cases cited by the appellant. In Sims v. State a,r 7eorgia,
389 U.S. 404 (1967), Negroes constituted 24 per cent
of the taxpayers but only 2.4 per cent of the grand
jury lists and 9.8 per cent of the petit jury lists. In
Arnold v. State of North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964),
Negroes and whites were listed separately on the
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tax records and in twenty-four years, only one
Negro had been on the grand jury. In Whitusv.Stateof.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), Negroes. constituted 27
per cent of the taxpayers and less than 8 per cent
of the names appeared on the jury lists. These case$ .
do not stand for the proposition that if it is shown
that a group is excluded from jury service, discrimination is present, but they stand for tli.e proposition
that if the number of Negroes chosen is an improb- ·
able result of random selection, that fact is prima
fade evidence of discrimina:tion because a large and
unexplained disparity between the population of
Negroes on the venires and in the popula:tion is unlikely to result from random selection. Finkelstein,
The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jur.Y
Discrimination Cases, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 338 (1966). This

proposition is further supported by the Supreme
Court holding in Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
0965), that the evidence based upon a statistical analysis was not sufficient to constitute a prirna facie
case of discrimination even though it seemed to indicate that a portion of the Negro community had
been excluded from jury service. In other words.
the evidence did not indicate such a disparity between Negroes participating in jury service and the
total Negro community to render the process an improbable result of random selection.
The respondent asserts that the appellant has
failed to carry his burden of proof to prove that discrimination was present in the instant case. In support of his argument, the appellant has only cited
the relevant Utah statute as prima facie evidence of
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exclusion, and this is not sufficient to prove purposeful discrimination. The Supreme Court has clearly
held that purposeful discrimination cannot be merely asserted or assumed. Terrance v. Florida, 188 U.S.
519 (1903); Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426
(1903); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896). Proof
must be of the nature as that found in the civil
rights cases which demonstrate that the selection
process creates such a disparity that the result is
not possible under a random selection process.
Otherwise, the system is free from any arbitrary
and systematic exclusion unless such proof is
present. The respondent submits that the citing of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-17 (1953) is insufficient to
establish discriminatory methods of jury selection.
The statute does not indicate that different standards of qualifications were applied to different groups
within the community in an attempt to exclude a
specific group of otherwise qualified jurors. The
appellant's argument may
out that the system
bf jury selection is not perfect but this is not equivalent to purposeful discrimination. Swain v. Alabama,
supra; Hoyt v. State of Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
When the civil rights cases do not apply to a
group that the appellant alleges is discriminated
against, the appellant relies upon Hernandes v. State of
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954):
"The constitutional command forbidding
intentional exclusion is not limited to Negroes.
It applies to any identifiable group in the
community which may be the subject of prejudice." Id. at 478.
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The. appellee .s u b mi ts that this statement is
dictum as the facts involved a group of Mexican
descent and does not stand for the broad proposi·
tion that the appellant alleges. Within its context,
this statement is. limited to racial groups in our community which may be the subject of prejudice and
does not pertain to the young, poor, non-property
holders, or female groups. These
do not
come within the constitutional principle of Equal
Protection of the Fourteenth Amendment in
this case because there are not sufficient facts or
evidence which indicate that arbitrary or discrim·
inatory methods were applied during the jury
selection process. Consequently, the appellant's
argument fails to establish any· discrimination or
purposeful exclusion in the instant case.
CONCLUSION
The appellee submits that the jury was properly
instructed on the distinctions between murder and
voluntary manslaughter, and that the selection of
the jury was free from arbitrary and discriminatory
methods. The appellant respectfully submits that
the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

